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Abstract
We consider non-cooperative multilateral bargaining games with endogenous bargaining
protocols. Under an endogenous protocol, the probability with which a player becomes the
proposer in a round of bargaining depends on the identity of the player who previously
rejected. An important example is the frequently studied rejector-becomes-proposer pro-
tocol. We focus on subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies which are shown to
exist and to be ecient. Equilibrium proposals do not depend on the probability to propose
conditional on the rejection by another player, though equilibrium acceptance sets do de-
pend on these probabilities. Next we consider the limit, as the bargaining friction vanishes.
In case no player has a positive probability to propose conditional on his rejection, each
player receives his utopia payo conditional on being recognized and equilibrium payos
are in general Pareto inecient. Otherwise, equilibrium proposals of all players converge to
a weighted Nash Bargaining Solution, where the weights are determined by the probability
to propose conditional on a rejection.
Keywords: Strategic Bargaining, Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, Stationary Strate-
gies, Nash Bargaining Solution
JEL codes: C78
1 Introduction
This paper examines the convergence of equilibrium payos in a non-cooperative bargaining
game to the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. In contrast to the existing literature
on this topic, we allow for the proposer selection to be endogenous, that is, inuenced by
the players' actions throughout the game.
We contribute to the so-called Nash program, a research agenda which investigates
the relationship between solution concepts from the cooperative (axiomatic) and non-
cooperative (strategic) branches of game theory. The classic example is the treatment
of the bargaining problem by Nash (1950, 1953). The bargaining problem here refers to a
situation where two players can choose one element of a convex set of feasible payo pairs
by mutual consent. If they fail to agree, an exogenously given pair of disagreement payos
will realize. The Nash bargaining solution is that payo pair which maximizes the product
of players' gains over their disagreement payo. Nash (1950) shows that this is the unique
bargaining solution satisfying the axioms of scale invariance, symmetry, eciency, and
independence of irrelevant alternatives. Nash (1953) presents a non-cooperative demand
game with two players who are uncertain about which payo pairs are feasible. In the
limit as uncertainty vanishes, equilibrium payos converge to those predicted by the Nash
bargaining solution. In another seminal paper, Rubinstein (1982) also obtains convergence
of equilibrium payos to the Nash Bargaining Solution, but in a bargaining game with
alternating oers. In their discussion of cooperative and non-cooperative approaches to
bargaining, Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986) obtain the Nash bargaining solu-
tion in the limit if either players' impatience or the risk of an exogenous breakdown of the
negotiations is vanishing.
The asymmetric Nash bargaining solution (Kalai 1977) maximizes a weighted product
of players' gains over the disagreement payos. It reduces to the Nash bargaining solution
when the weights are equal across players. Moreover, it is straightforward to generalize
the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution to the case with an arbitrary number of players.
However, the analysis of non-cooperative bargaining games with more than two players
presents substantial diculties as long as one insists on unanimity.1 In multilateral una-
nimity bargaining, one typically obtains a wide multiplicity of subgame-perfect equilibrium
payos. Much of the literature has dealt with this multiplicity by restricting attention to
subgame-perfect equilibria in stationary strategies. This restriction allows for a unique
1There is a branch of literature which circumvents the complications involved in bargaining with more
than two players by relaxing the unanimity rule, particularly by allowing partial agreements. Examples
of such an approach can be found in Krishna and Serrano (1996), Chae and Yang (1994), and Suh and
Wen (2006). In the paper at hand, however, we are interested in situations where a comprehensive and
unanimous agreement is required.
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prediction of the limit of equilibrium payo allocations. In this vein, Hart and Mas-Colell
(1996) give an early support result for the Nash bargaining solution. Kultti and Vartiainen
(2010) consider the extension of the model of Rubinstein (1982) to an arbitrary number
of players and assume that proposers rotate according to some xed order. They show
convergence to the Nash bargaining solution in the limit. Extensions of the Rubinstein
model where the proposer is selected in each period according to a time-invariant proba-
bility distribution, support the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution with the probability
distribution as the weight vector as has been demonstrated by Laruelle and Valenciano
(2008) and Miyakawa (2008). All these results are special cases of Britz, Herings, and
Predtetchinski (2010), who model the proposer selection process as a Markov chain, and
obtain convergence to the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution where the weight vector is
given by the stationary distribution of the Markov chain. All these proposer selection pro-
tocols are exogenous in the sense that the actions of the players in the game have no eect
on the identity of the next proposer. To the best of our knowledge, the entire literature
that has provided non-cooperative support for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution
considers exogenous protocols only.
Restricting attention to exogenous protocols, however, seems to be a serious limitation.
More in particular, the proposer selection may be inuenced by the identity of the player
who rejects a particular proposal. One simple and intuitively appealing example is the
protocol where the player who rejects the current proposal is automatically called to make
the next proposal. This rejector-becomes-proposer protocol has been introduced in Selten
(1981) and has been studied extensively in both the bargaining and the coalition formation
literature, see for example Chatterjee, Dutta, Ray, and Sengupta (1993), Bloch (1996), Ray
and Vohra (1999), Imai and Salonen (2000), and Bloch and Diamantoudi (2011) to name
a few. Of course, this protocol reduces to Rubinstein's alternating oers model when there
are only two players.
The protocol we study in this paper is more general than the rejector-becomes-proposer
protocol. Following Kawamori (2008), we are interested in the case where the identity of the
player who rejects a proposal may inuence the probability by which a particular player
becomes the next proposer. Clearly, the rejector-becomes-proposer protocol is a special
case of the protocol we consider. Another special case is the protocol where a rejector
proposes in the next period with probability zero. It is the polar opposite of the rejector-
becomes-proposer protocol, and can be intuitively justied by the idea that one may want
to design a protocol which discourages rejections by punishing them with a zero recognition
probability. Moreover, also the protocol with time-invariant recognition probabilities is a
special case of the analysis in this paper. In general, however, our protocol does depend
on the approval/rejection decisions of the players involved in the bargaining process, and
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is therefore indeed endogenous.
Endogenous protocols are considerably more dicult to analyze than exogenous ones,
and the literature has identied a number of cases where both types of protocol lead to
surprisingly dierent results. For instance, Chatterjee, Dutta, Ray, and Sengupta (1993)
provide examples for non-existence of equilibria as well as existence of equilibria with
delay in the context of an endogenous protocol. On the contrary, it has been shown in
Okada (1996) that delay cannot occur at equilibrium and in Okada (2011) that equilibria
exist when the protocol is exogenous. Similarly, there are examples for non-existence
of equilibrium in Bloch (1996) under an endogenous protocol while Herings and Houba
(2010) restore existence for an exogenous proposer selection protocol. Duggan (2011)
present a very general coalitional bargaining model where equilibrium existence is shown for
exogenous protocols. The paper points out that a similar approach to establish equilibrium
existence would not work when the protocol is endogenous.
Our main ndings are as follows. We rst consider the payo allocations that are sup-
ported by subgame-perfect equilibria in stationary strategies. We show that for any value
of the continuation probability such an equilibrium exists, that equilibria are characterized
by the absence of delay, and that all equilibrium proposals specify a Pareto ecient payo
allocation, results that would not carry over to the more general environment of coali-
tional bargaining as evidenced by the examples in Chatterjee, Dutta, Ray, and Sengupta
(1993). Equilibrium proposals do not depend on the probability to propose conditional on
the rejection by another player, though equilibrium acceptance sets do depend on these
probabilities.
Regarding results on the limit of equilibrium payos as the continuation probability
tends to one, we nd a distinction between two cases. If none of the players has a positive
probability of being the next proposer after his own rejection, then the proposer in the
initial round obtains his utopia payo, that is his highest payo in the set of feasible
payos that satisfy all the individual rationality constraints. Since the initial proposer
is selected according to some given probability distribution, the utilities are in general
not Pareto ecient, and do therefore not correspond to an asymmetric Nash bargaining
solution. Otherwise, we nd convergence of the equilibrium payos to a weighted Nash
bargaining solution, where the weights are determined by the probabilities of making a
counter-oer. Players with a zero probability of making a counter-oer will receive a
payo of zero.
The existence of equilibria in stationary strategies and the convergence to a weighted
Nash bargaining solution are established results under exogenous protocols and we show
that they carry over to our setting with an endogenous protocol if and only if there is at
least one player with a strictly positive recognition probability conditional on his rejection.
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However, we see that the bargaining weights depend only on part of the data on the
recognition probabilities. In particular, for the limit bargaining equilibrium payos it is
only relevant with what probability a player proposes after his own rejection. Conversely,
it is not important with what probability a player proposes after another player's rejection.
Moreover, we nd that the payo allocation in the limit bargaining equilibrium exhibits a
discontinuity when the probabilities of making a counter-oer are zero for all players. In
that case, the initial proposer has all the bargaining power, and hence the expected payos
depend on the probability distribution which determines the proposer of the rst round.
Romer and Rosenthal (1978) is among the most inuential papers emphasizing the role
of proposal making on the selected alternative. Kalandrakis (2006) shows in a bargain-
ing framework that the proposer selection process is more important than voting rights,
impatience, or complex equilibrium strategies in explaining political power. Empirical sup-
port for this feature in the context of the allocation of transportation funds in the US is
provided by Knight (2005). The existing results on non-cooperative bargaining games are
for exogenous protocols only and do not distinguish between the probability of making a
proposal and the probability of making a proposal conditional on a rejection. Our paper
argues that the latter probabilities are the ones that really matter to explain bargaining
power.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the bargaining game with an
endogenous protocol. Section 3 presents a characterization of the set of subgame perfect
equilibria in stationary strategies. Section 4 introduces the concept of a bargaining equilib-
rium, a selection of the subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies. It is shown that,
in payo terms, the set of bargaining equilibria is equivalent to the set of subgame perfect
equilibrium in stationary strategies. It is also shown that a bargaining equilibrium exists.
Section 5 studies the case where conditional on his rejection, there is zero probability that a
player becomes a proposer, and shows an ineciency result for this case. Section 6 studies
the limit bargaining equilibrium for the complementary case and presents the convergence
to the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. Section 7 presents an example to illustrate
the discontinuity in the limit bargaining equilibrium payos. Section 8 concludes.
2 The Bargaining Game
We consider a bargaining game between nitely many players. The set of players is
N = f1; : : : ; ng. Each player individually can only attain a disagreement payo which
we normalize to zero. However, the players can jointly achieve any payo vector v in a set
V  Rn if they unanimously agree on such a payo vector. Each player is assumed to be
an expected utility maximizer. The set V of feasible payos and the bargaining protocol
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are the main primitives of the model. We now introduce each in turn.
For vectors u and v in Rn; we write u  v if ui  vi for all i 2 N; u > v if u  v and
u 6= v; and u  v if ui > vi for all i 2 N: A point v of V is said to be Pareto{ecient if
there is no point u in V such that u > v: A point v of V is said to be weakly Pareto{ecient
if there is no point u in V such that u v: We write V+ to denote the set V \ Rn+.
Our rst assumption is as follows:
[A1] The set V is closed, convex, and comprehensive from below. There is a point v 2 V
such that v  0: The set V+ is bounded. Each weakly Pareto{ecient point of V+ is
Pareto{ecient.
We will denote by P the set of Pareto-ecient points of V and write P+ for the set
P \ Rn+.
Bargaining takes place in discrete time t = 0; 1; : : :. There are n+ 1 probability distri-
butions on the players denoted by 0; 1; : : : ; n, each of which belongs to the unit simplex
n in Rn:
In round t = 0, a particular player is chosen as the proposer according to the probability
distribution 0 2 n. The proposer then makes a proposal v 2 V . Player 1 responds to the
proposal by either acceptance or rejection. Once a player i = 1; : : : ; n  1 has accepted the
proposal, it is the turn of player i+ 1 to accept or to reject.2 Once player n has accepted
the proposal, the game ends and the approved proposal is implemented.
As soon as some player j 2 N rejects a proposal in round t, the game ends with prob-
ability 1   > 0 and payos to all players are zero. With the complementary probability
, the game continues to round t + 1. The proposer in that round is then drawn from
the probability distribution j. If the game continues perpetually without agreement, the
payo to every player is zero.
In case 0; 1; : : : ; n all coincide, we are back in the familiar case of an exogenous proto-
col with time-invariant recognition probabilities. The rejector-becomes-proposer protocol
follows from specifying ii = 1 for all i 2 N: A polar opposite of the rejector-becomes-
proposer protocol, where a rejector proposes with probability zero in the next round,
follows by setting ii = 0 for all i 2 N:
It is well-known that bargaining games with more than two players admit a wide multi-
plicity of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE), see Herrero (1985) and Haller (1986). We will
therefore restrict attention to SPE in stationary strategies (SSPE). A stationary strategy
for player i consists of a proposal i 2 V which i makes whenever it is his turn to propose
2Throughout the paper, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that players respond to a proposal in the
xed order 1; : : : ; n: We show in the appendix that all results carry over to the case with arbitrary voting
orders.
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and an acceptance set Ai  V which consists of all the proposals which player i would
be willing to accept if they were oered to him. We denote the social acceptance set by
A = \i2NAi and write the prole of stationary strategies (1; A1; : : : ; n; An) more concisely
as (;A).
3 Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Stationary Strategies
In this section, we consider the set of SSPEs of the bargaining game. Fix some prole of
stationary strategies (;A). By denition of a stationary strategy, there is a unique payo
vector which is expected in any subgame following a rejection by some player i 2 N: We
refer to it as the vector of continuation payos after i's rejection and denote it by qi(;A).
Since it will be clear from the context, we omit the argument in the sequel. Moreover,
we dene a vector r(;A) of reservation payos by r(;A) = (q11; : : : ; qnn). Again, we will
omit the argument in the sequel. It is important to note at this stage that the endogenous
protocol which we consider induces a disparity between the continuation and the reservation
payos. Depending on the identity of the player who rejects the current proposal, one out
of n dierent continuation payo vectors will realize. When these n vectors are thought
of as the columns of a matrix, the reservation payos correspond to its diagonal. If the
protocol is exogenous, all the columns of this matrix are identical since the sequel of the
game is then not inuenced by the identity of the rejector. We will see that the reservation
payos are important as an \acceptance threshold" in a sense to be made precise in the
next two lemmas.
For every i 2 N , let S(i) = fj 2 N jj  ig. That is, S(i) is the set of players succeeding
player i in the response order, including i himself. We denote \j2S(i)Aj by AS(i):
Lemma 3.1 Let (;A) be an SSPE inducing reservation payos r. It holds that
1. If v 2 V is such that vn > rn, then v 2 An.
2. For every i = 1; : : : ; n  1, if v 2 AS(i+1) and vi > ri, then v 2 Ai.
Proof: Consider a history of the game where player n has to respond to the proposal
v with vn > rn. If player n accepts, the proposal passes and he receives vn. If he rejects,
he expects to receive rn; so he would have a protable deviation at this history. This
establishes the rst part of the lemma. Now consider a history of the game where player
i 2 Nnfng has to respond to the proposal v with vi > ri and i 2 AS(i+1): If player i accepts
v; this proposal passes and he receives vi: Otherwise, he receives ri; so he would have a
protable deviation at this history. 
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Lemma 3.1 implies that a proposal lies in the social acceptance set if all players receive
strictly higher utility from this proposal than from the vector r of reservation payos.
Corollary 3.2 Let (;A) be an SSPE inducing reservation payos r. If v  r, then
v 2 A.
We consider next a necessary condition for proposals to be accepted.
Lemma 3.3 Let (;A) be an SSPE inducing reservation payos r. For every i = 1; : : : ; n;
if v 2 AS(i); then vj  rj for all j 2 S(i):
Proof: Suppose by way of contradiction that v 2 AS(i) but there is j  i such that
vj < rj: If player j unilaterally deviates to reject rather than to accept the proposal v, he
receives a payo of rj. This deviation is protable. 
Lemma 3.3 is a slightly weaker statement than the converse of Lemma 3.3. It says that
if a proposal gives at least one player strictly less than his reservation payo, then that
proposal will not be unanimously accepted.
Corollary 3.4 Let (;A) be an SSPE inducing reservation payos r. For all v 2 A it
holds that v  r:
The two foregoing statements leave some indeterminacy with regard to the accept/reject
decisions of individual players; we address this issue in detail later on. With the above
lemmas, we have shown how exactly the vector r plays the role of an acceptance threshold.
The next lemma derives the implication that an agreement can be reached only if r belongs
to the set V+.
Lemma 3.5 Let (;A) be an SSPE inducing reservation payos r. Then there exists a
v 2 V such that v  r  0. In particular, it holds that A 6= ; and r 2 V+:
Proof: Any player i can choose to reject all proposals, a strategy that never leads to
an agreement irrespective of the strategy used by the other players, and a payo of zero
for all players. It follows that player i's payo in any subgame perfect equilibrium cannot
be smaller than zero. In particular, it follows that r  0:
Suppose now that there is no v 2 V such that v  r. In view of Assumption A1, there
is no v 2 V such that v > r: It now follows from Corollary 3.4 that A  frg. First suppose
that A = ;. In this case equilibrium strategies lead to payos of zero for all players, so
r = 0. But under Assumption A1 there is a vector v 2 V with v  0, a contradiction to
our supposition. Hence A = frg.
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Then, after a rejection, only two outcomes are possible: Either agreement on r is
reached at some future time or zero payos result. The vector of players' continuation
payos after a rejection is therefore a convex combination of 0 and r, where the former has
a weight of at least 1  . But this implies ri  ri for all i 2 N . Since  < 1, we conclude
that r = 0. As before, this leads to a contradiction. 
Lemma 3.5 implies that at an SSPE a proposer is always able to make a proposal
which gives all players a strictly higher payo than their reservation payos, and which
will therefore be accepted. However, with the endogenous protocol under consideration
here, it is not immediate that the proposer nds it in his best interest to make such an
acceptable proposal. This complication is due to the disparity which exists in our model
between the continuation payos q1; : : : ; qn and the reservation payos r. In particular,
if some continuation payo qji is high enough, one might conjecture that player i would
prefer making a proposal which will be rejected by player j rather than make an acceptable
proposal. The next step in our argument is to show that such behavior is not consistent with
SSPE. More precisely, we will show in the next lemma that each player's SSPE proposal
is acceptable and therefore SSPEs lead to immediate agreement.
Lemma 3.6 Let (;A) be an SSPE. For all i 2 N it holds that i 2 A and ii > 0:
Proof: Let ui be the SSPE utility to player i conditional on reaching a history where
it is player i's turn to make a proposal. It holds that ui = 
i
i if 
i 2 A and ui = qji if i =2 A,
where j is the least element of N such that i =2 Aj.
By making a proposal v 2 A; player i guarantees himself a payo of vi. It follows that
ui  vi for every v 2 A. In particular ui > 0 since Corollary 3.2 and Lemma 3.5 imply
that there is a vector v 2 A such that vi > 0.
Let U be the set of proposals k for k 2 N that belong to the social acceptance set
A, along with the vector 0. Following the rejection of player i's proposal i by player j,
the vector qj of continuation payos is a convex combination of the vectors in U , with 0
having a weight of at least 1   . We know from the preceding paragraph that ui  ki
for all k 2 U and that ui > 0. It follows that ui > qji : But this implies that player i's
equilibrium proposal i is not rejected by player j, i.e. i 2 A, establishing the rst claim.
Moreover, ii = ui > 0: 
The previous lemma implies that immediate agreement will be reached in an SSPE. In
the following lemma, we show that the proposer always gives other players their reservation
payos and then maximizes his own payo.
Lemma 3.7 Let (;A) be an SSPE inducing reservation payos r. For every i 2 N; it
holds that i 2 P+ and ij = rj for all j 2 Nnfig:
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Proof: We show rst that i 2 P+ for all i 2 N: By Corollary 3.4, Lemma 3.5, and
Lemma 3.6 we have i  r  0: In view of Assumption A1 it suces to prove that i is
weakly Pareto{ecient. Suppose to the contrary. Then there is a vector v 2 V such that
v  i. Hence v  r and so by Corollary 3.2 v 2 A. At a history where player i is the
proposer, he has a protable deviation by proposing v instead of i since vi > 
i
i. The
contradiction establishes the rst part of the claim.
We prove that each responder receives exactly his reservation payo. Dene the vector
v by vi = 
i
i and vj = rj for every j 2 N n fig. Then i  v  r. Suppose, contrary to our
claim, that there is a player j 2 N n fig such that ij > rj. Then ij > vj, and hence v is
not Pareto{ecient. In view of our Assumption A1, v is not weakly Pareto{ecient. So
there exists a vector v0 2 V with v0  v. But then v0  r so by Corollary 3.2 it holds that
v0 2 A. Since in particular v0i > vi = ii, proposing the vector v0 instead of i is a protable
deviation for player i. 
For every i 2 N , we dene
i =
ii
1   + ii
:
Corollary 3.8 Let (;A) be an SSPE inducing reservation payos r. For all i 2 N it
holds that ri = i
i
i:
Proof: Since each proposal belongs to the social acceptance set, the reservation payos
can be computed as follows:
ri = 
nX
j=1
ij
j
i = 
i
i
i
i + (1  ii)ri:
Solving for ri yields the desired expression. 
In the following theorem, we collect all the necessary conditions that we have derived
so far for a strategy prole to be an SSPE.
Theorem 3.9 If (;A) is an SSPE inducing reservation payos r, then
AS(i)  \j=i;:::;nfv 2 V jvj  rjg; i 2 N; (3.1)
An  fv 2 V jvn > rng; (3.2)
Ai  fv 2 AS(i+1)jvi > rig; i 2 Nnfng; (3.3)
ij = rj; i 2 N; j 2 N n fig; (3.4)
ri = i
i
i; i 2 N; (3.5)
i 2 P+ \ A; i 2 N: (3.6)
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One important implication of the foregoing analysis is that a responding player who
does not have positive probability of making a counter-oer will not be oered a positive
payo. Indeed, if ii = 0 for some player i; then i = 0 and so ri = 0.
Corollary 3.10 Let (;A) be an SSPE inducing reservation payos r and let i 2 N be a
player with ii = 0: Then it holds that ri = 0 and 
i
j = 0 for all j 2 Nnfig.
We dene the utopia payo v^i of a player i 2 N as the highest payo in V player i
can obtain subject to the individual rationality constraints, that is v^i = maxfvi j v 2 V+g.
Let v^ = (v^1; : : : ; v^n). Consider the case where all players have zero probability to make a
counter-oer conditional on a rejection. That is, suppose ii = 0 for all i 2 N . In that
case, Theorem 3.9 readily implies that at any history where player i is the proposer, he
receives his utopia payo in an SSPE.
Corollary 3.11 Assume ii = 0 for all i 2 N: In any SSPE, the payo to player i 2 N is
equal to 0i v^i:
4 Bargaining Equilibrium
In this section we show that SSPEs exist. To do so, we will show the existence of a
particular type of SSPE called bargaining equilibrium. We will also argue that in terms of
payos nothing is lost by restricting attention to bargaining equilibria.
Consider proposals  2 V n+ . We dene acceptance sets A() as a function of these
proposals. We begin with the acceptance set for player n and then proceed inductively to
dene the acceptance sets of players n  1; : : : ; 1. Indeed, let
An() = fv 2 V j vn  nnng :
Now suppose that for some player i 2 N n fng, the acceptance set Aj() has been
dened for all j 2 S(i + 1). For any v 2 V , we dene player i's payo upon acceptance of
v as follows:
i(v) =
8>>>><>>>>:
vi; if v 2
n\
j=i+1
Aj();
ii

(1  )ki + ii
1   + ii

; if v 2
k 1\
j=i+1
Aj() n Ak() for some k 2 S(i+ 1);
where \k 1j=i+1Aj() is equal to Rn by denition if k = i+ 1: As will become clear from the
subsequent discussion, the payo i(v) corresponds to the payo to player i from accepting
the proposal v: We dene
Ai() =

v 2 V j i(v)  iii
	
:
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The construction of acceptance sets A() is now complete. We denote by A() the con-
comitant social acceptance set, that is, the intersection of the sets Ai(); i = 1; : : : ; n.
Denition 4.1 A bargaining equilibrium is a strategy prole (;A()) such that for all
i 2 N;
i 2 P+; (4.1)
ij = j
j
j ; j 2 N n fig: (4.2)
Since the coecients i do not depend on 
i
j for j 6= i; we see that the equilibrium pro-
posals in a bargaining equilibrium do not depend on the probability to propose conditional
on the rejection by another player. As is clear from the construction above, equilibrium
acceptance sets do depend on these probabilities.
We show next that in a bargaining equilibrium there is no delay before reaching an
agreement.
Theorem 4.2 In a bargaining equilibrium (;A()); agreement is reached immediately:
for all i 2 N; i 2 A():
Proof: We prove the result by induction. For i 2 N n fng; we have in = nnn; so
i 2 An(): For i = n; since n < 1; we have nn  nnn; so n 2 An():
Now suppose that for some player j 2 N n fng it holds that i 2 Ak() for all k 2
S(j + 1): We show that i 2 Aj() thereby completing the proof.
By the induction hypothesis it holds that j(
i) = ij: For i 2 N n fjg; we have
j(
i) = ij = j
j
j ;
so i 2 Aj(): For i = j; since j < 1; we have
j(
j) = jj  jjj ;
so j 2 Aj(): 
Since bargaining equilibrium proposals do not depend on the probability to propose
conditional on the rejection by another player, and equilibrium proposals are accepted
without delay, it follows that the equilibrium utility depends on the initial recognition
probabilities 0 and on the probability to propose conditional on an own rejection ii; but
not on the probabilities ij for j 6= i:
Another important feature of a bargaining equilibrium is that there is an advantage to
being the proposer. To see this, simply notice that i < 1, so that 
i
j < 
i
i for j 6= i.
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The continuation payo to player i after a rejection of a proposal by player k can be
computed as follows:
qki (;A()) = 
nX
j=1
kj 
j
i = 
k
i 
i
i + (1  ki )

ii
1   + ii

ii
= ii

(1  )ki + ii
1   + ii

:
The reservation payos are given by
ri(;A()) = qii(;A()) = iii:
In a bargaining equilibrium, each responder receives precisely his reservation payo. The
payo i(v) upon acceptance of v is vi if v 2 Aj() for every player j 2 S(i+ 1) and it is
qki otherwise, where k is the lowest indexed player in S(i+ 1) with v =2 Ak(). Thus i(v)
is the payo to i from accepting the proposal v: Player i accepts the proposal v if and only
if i(v)  ri.
For v to be an element of the social acceptance set A() in a bargaining equilibrium,
it should hold that vi  iii for all i 2 N: Indeed, when v 2 A(); we have that i(v) = vi
for all i 2 N; so v 2 Ai() implies vi  iii for all i 2 N: It is also easily veried that the
converse is true, if vi  iii for all i 2 N; then v 2 A(): It follows that in a bargaining
equilibrium (;A());
A() = fv 2 V j 8i 2 N; vi  iiig:
We now discuss the relationship between SSPE and bargaining equilibrium. We show
that each bargaining equilibrium is an SSPE. While an SSPE need not be a bargaining
equilibrium, it induces one in a natural way. Intuitively, a bargaining equilibrium can be
thought of as an SSPE that breaks the indierence in the accept/reject decisions in favor of
acceptance. Our results imply that in as much as we are interested in equilibrium proposals
and payos rather than acceptance sets, there is no loss in focussing the analysis on the
set of bargaining equilibria rather than the set of SSPEs.
Theorem 4.3 A bargaining equilibrium is an SSPE.
Proof: Let (;A()) be a bargaining equilibrium. By denition, the bargaining equi-
librium is a prole of stationary strategies. We show that it is a subgame perfect equilib-
rium. Applying the one-shot deviation property, we have to show that at any history the
acting player has no protable one-shot deviation.
Consider rst a one-shot deviation in the accept/reject decisions. By construction of
A(), a responder accepts a proposal if and only if accepting makes him weakly better o
than rejecting. Hence, a one-shot deviation cannot be protable.
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Now consider a one-shot deviation by player i; who proposes some v 2 V nfig. Suppose
that v 62 A(). Then, the expected payo to player i from proposing v is qki where k is
the rst player in the response order to reject v. It follows from the expression for the
continuation payos given above that
qki = 
i
i

(1  )ki + ii
1   + ii

 ii  ii;
so the deviation is not protable. Now consider the case where v 2 A(). Then vj  jjj
for every j 2 N and hence vj  ij for every j 2 N n fig. Since the vector i is Pareto{
ecient, we must have vi  ii. Again, the deviation is not protable. 
Theorem 4.4 If (;A) is an SSPE, then (;A()) is a bargaining equilibrium.
Proof: Condition (4.1) of Denition 4.1 is implied by Condition (3.6) of Theorem 3.9.
Condition (4.2) is implied by Conditions (3.4){(3.6) of Theorem 3.9. 
By Condition (3.6) of Theorem 3.9 it holds that there is immediate agreement in any
SSPE. It therefore follows from Theorems 4.3 and 4.4 that the distinction between SSPE
and bargaining equilibrium is immaterial. The set of SSPE utilities coincides with the set
of bargaining equilibrium utilities. It follows in particular that SSPE utilities depend on
the initial recognition probabilities 0 and on the probability to propose conditional on an
own rejection ii; but not on the probabilities 
i
j for j 6= i:
Theorem 4.5 A bargaining equilibrium exists.
Proof: Let us dene  2 n and  2 [0; 1) as follows. If ii > 0 for at least one i 2 N ,
then
i =
iiPn
j=1 
j
j
; i 2 N;
 =

Pn
i=1 
i
i
1 +Pni=1 ii :
If ii = 0 for all i 2 N , then we set  = 0 and i = 1n for all i 2 N . After elemen-
tary calculus, it follows from Denition 4.1 that the system of characteristic equations
describing bargaining equilibrium proposals of our model with recognition probabilities
0; 1; : : : ; n and continuation probability  coincides with the system of characteristic
equations which describes equilibrium proposals in a bargaining model with time-invariant
recognition probabilities  and continuation probability . The existence of a solution to
the latter system has been shown by Banks and Duggan (2000) in their Theorems 1 and
2.3 
3In Banks and Duggan (2000) the continuation probability is 1, and players have time preferences with
a discount factor equal to : Voting is simultaneous rather than sequential, and attention is restricted
to stage-undominated voting strategies. For the case with time-invariant recognition probabilities, both
modeling choices lead to exactly the same equilibrium conditions on proposals as in Denition 4.1.
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We have shown that a bargaining equilibrium is an SSPE, so the existence of an SSPE
is implied by the theorem above.
Corollary 4.6 An SSPE exists.
5 No Possibility to Propose after a Rejection
In this section we study the case where conditional on a rejection there is zero probability
to be selected as a proposer, so ii = 0 for every player i 2 N: Corollary 3.11 states that
in any SSPE the payo to player i 2 N is equal to 0i v^i: Notice that this expression is
independent of the continuation probability : Moreover, in case P+ is not a simplex, i.e.
P+ cannot be written as the convex hull of n extreme points, and each player has a positive
probability to be the initial proposer, equilibrium payos are in the interior of the set V
and therefore inecient.
Theorem 5.1 Assume P+ is not a simplex, 
i
i = 0 for all i 2 N; and 0  0: All SSPEs
are inecient.
Proof: By Corollary 3.11 it holds that SSPE utilities are equal to
P
i2N 
0
i v^ie(i);
where e(i) denotes the i-th unit vector in Rn: Since P+ is not a simplex, there is p 2
P+ n conv(fv^ie(i) j i 2 Ng); where conv(X) denotes the convex hull of a set of points X:
Choose weights i 2 R; i 2 N; such that p =
P
i2N iv^ie(i): Since p  0; it holds that
i  0 for all i 2 N: It then follows that
P
i2N i > 1; since
P
i2N i < 1 contradicts the
Pareto optimality of p; and
P
i2N i = 1 implies p 2 conv(fv^ie(i) j i 2 Ng); leading to a
contradiction as well.
Take  > 0 suciently small such that 0     0: Notice that non-negativity of
0    implies that  < 1: We dene  2  by
 =
1
1   (
0   ) + (
P
i2N i   1)
1   e(1);
and v 2 conv(fv^ie(i) j i 2 Ng)  V by
v =
X
i2N
iv^ie(i):
By convexity of V it holds that p+ (1  )v 2 V: Straightforward calculus shows that
p+ (1  )v = (01 + (
X
i2N
i   1))v^1e(1) +
X
i2Nnf1g
0i v^ie(i):
Since
P
i2N i   1 > 0 and  > 0 it holds that p+ (1  )v is a point in V which Pareto
dominates the vector of SSPE utilities. 
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Although at rst glance it might appear as a good idea to deny players the right to
make a proposal following a rejection, Theorem 5.1 claims that the contrary is the case.
Since such protocols give all bargaining power to the initial proposer, the equilibrium result
is a lottery where player i receives his utopia payo v^i with probability 
0
i and a payo
of 0 with probability 1   0i ; leading to inecient equilibrium utilities when players are
risk-averse, or, more generally, when P+ is not a simplex.
6 The Limit Bargaining Equilibrium
In this section, we study the case where at least one player has a positive probability to make
a counter-oer conditional on a rejection, so there is a player i 2 N with ii > 0: Moreover,
we focus on the convergence of bargaining equilibrium payos as the bargaining friction
vanishes, i.e. as the continuation probability  tends to one. We employ the additional
assumption A2, which is imposed throughout this section without further mentioning.
A vector  in Rn is a normal vector to V at a point v 2 V if (u   v)>  0 for all
u 2 V . It is said to be a unit normal vector if kk = 1.
[A2] There is a continuous function  : P+ ! Rn such that (v) is a unit normal vector
to V at the point v:
Assumption A2 implies that the boundary P+ does not have kinks. Notice that in view of
Assumption A1 we have i(v) > 0 for every i 2 N such that vi > 0: All the existing results
on the convergence of multi-lateral bargaining to the weighted Nash bargaining solution
for exogenous protocols make Assumption A2. Indeed, without such an assumption, Kultti
and Vartiainen (2010) provide an example showing that the unique bargaining equilibrium
may not converge to the Nash bargaining solution and Herings and Predtetchinski (2011)
show that the limit of bargaining equilibria may not be unique.
Lemma 6.1 Let (m)m2N be a sequence of continuation probabilities converging to 1 from
below. For every m 2 N, let (1m; : : : ; nm) be bargaining equilibrium proposals of the game
with continuation probability m. If the sequence (
1
m; : : : ; 
n
m) converges to (
1; : : : ; n);
then 1 =    = n. Moreover, for every i 2 N , the point i is Pareto{ecient.
Proof: We prove rst that for every i 2 N the point i is Pareto{ecient. Suppose
not. Then, in view of Assumption A1, there is i 2 N and v 2 V such that v  i. But
then v  im for m large enough, which contradicts the denition of bargaining equilibrium
where it is required that im 2 P+:
Take i 2 N such that ii > 0 and take any other player j 2 N . We wish to show that
j = i. For every m 2 N; for every k 2 Nnfi; jg it holds that im;k = jm;k = m;kkm;k:
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Taking the limit as m goes to innity yields ik =
jk. Furthermore, for every m 2 N; we
have jm;i = m;i
i
m;i. Since m;i converges to one as m tends to innity, we obtain
ji =
ii.
We conclude that the vectors i and j can only dier in component j. Since both points
i and j are Pareto{ecient, we have i = j, as desired. 
The lemma above therefore justies the following denition.
Denition 6.2 A limit bargaining equilibrium is a proposal  2 V for which there ex-
ist sequences (m)m2N and (1m; : : : ; 
n
m)m2N, where (
1
m; : : : ; 
n
m) are bargaining equilibrium
proposals in the game with continuation probability m; such that (
i
m)m2N converges to 
for every i 2 N .
Since the proposals im in Lemma 6.1 all belong to the compact set V+; every sequence
(1m; : : : ; 
n
m)m2N has a convergent subsequence. This demonstrates the existence of a limit
bargaining equilibrium.
Corollary 6.3 A limit bargaining equilibrium exists. Each limit bargaining equilibrium is
Pareto ecient.
Theorem 6.4 Let  be a limit bargaining equilibrium.
1. If ii = 0 for some i 2 N; then i = 0.
2. Suppose there is exactly one player i 2 N with ii > 0. Then i is player i's utopia
payo v^i and j = 0 for j 6= i.
Proof: To prove Theorem 6.4.1, take a player i 2 N with ii = 0 and observe that in each
bargaining equilibrium ji = 0 for every j 6= i. Taking the limit of jm;i along the appropriate
sequence of bargaining equilibria yields i = 0. To prove Theorem 6.4.2, notice that j = 0
for j 6= i by Theorem 6.4.1. The fact that i is player i's utopia payo follows from the
fact that  is a Pareto{ecient point of V . 
We proceed by showing that the bargaining equilibrium is unique and is equal to the
asymmetric Nash bargaining solution where player i has weight ii. Given a vector  2
Rn+ n f0g; we dene the {Nash product  : Rn+ ! R by
(v) =
Y
i2N
vii ; v 2 Rn:
Denition 6.5 Given a vector  2 Rn+ n f0g, the maximizer of the function  on V+ is
called the {Nash bargaining solution.
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Under our assumptions the maximizer of the function  on V+ is indeed unique. It is
a Pareto{ecient point of V which is uniquely characterized by the following conditions:
i = 0 if and only if vi = 0; (6.1)
8i; j 2 N such that i; j > 0; i(v)
j(v)
=
i=vi
j=vj
: (6.2)
Theorem 6.6 The limit bargaining equilibrium is unique and is equal to the (11; : : : ; 
n
n){
Nash bargaining solution.
Proof: We verify that each limit bargaining equilibrium satises the conditions (6.1){(6.2).
Let
~N = fi 2 N j ii > 0g:
Let (1; : : : ; n) be a bargaining equilibrium in a game with continuation probability . By
the denition of the normal vector it holds for any two players i and j that
(j   i)>(i)  0:
Notice that the proposals i and j can only dier in components i and j. Solving for the
inner product, we can therefore rewrite the previous inequality as
(jj   ij)j(i) + (ji   ii)i(i)  0:
Substituting for ij and 
j
j from equation (4.2) and dividing by 1   yields
jjj(
i)
1   + jj
 
i
ii(
i)
1   + ii
:
Let  be a limit bargaining equilibrium. Then the previous inequality yields for all
i; j 2 ~N;
jj()
jj

ii()
ii
:
Interchanging the roles of the players i and j; we obtain the equality
jj()
jj
=
ii()
ii
; i; j 2 ~N: (6.3)
By Corollary 6.4.1 we have that
i = 0; i 2 N n ~N: (6.4)
It only remains to be shown that i > 0 for every i 2 ~N . Suppose to the contrary that
i = 0 for some i 2 ~N . Equation (6.3) and the fact that j() > 0 for all j 2 ~N imply
that j = 0 for all j 2 ~N . Combining this with (6.4) we have  = 0; which contradicts the
Pareto{eciency of : 
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7 Example
The analysis of bargaining equilibria reveals two rather striking features. First, only the
\diagonal" probabilities 11; : : : ; 
n
n are relevant for the bargaining equilibrium payos, to-
gether with the initial probability to propose 0 in case 11 =    = nn = 0: The chance
to become a proposer after a rejection by another player is not a source of bargaining
power. A player whose probability to become a proposer after his own rejection is zero,
will never be oered a positive payo. Second, the bargaining equilibrium payos exhibit a
discontinuity when all the probabilities 11; : : : ; 
n
n are equal to zero. In that case, whoever
is the proposer in the initial round can appropriate the entire surplus, which is no longer
the case when ii is non-zero for at least one i 2 N:
The following example illustrates these two features. There are four players, N =
f1; 2; 3; 4g. The vectors 1; : : : ; 4 are given by
 
1; 2; 3; 4

=
0BBB@
0 1 1 1  "
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 "
1CCCA :
We rst assume that " > 0 and suppose that the initial proposer is player 4 with
probability zero. Player 4 appears very weak in the example at hand. In order for player
4 to become the proposer at all, some proposal must be accepted by players 1, 2, and 3
and then be rejected by player 4. Even in that case, player 4 becomes the next proposer
only with probability ", which can be arbitrarily close to zero. Player 1 on the other hand,
could be the initial proposer with probability as high as one, becomes the next proposer for
sure whenever player 2 or player 3 makes a rejection, and becomes the next proposer with
probability 1   " whenever player 4 rejects. Nevertheless, our convergence result implies
that player 4 has all the bargaining power in the limit bargaining equilibrium and receives
his utopia payo. On the contrary, players 1, 2, and 3 receive zero payos in the limit
bargaining equilibrium.
Assume next that " = 0. In that case, we no longer have the convergence result
presented in Section 6, but rather know from Section 5 that the initial distribution 0 de-
termines the equilibrium payos, which, moreover, are independent from the continuation
probability : Since we assumed that player 4 is the initial proposer with probability zero,
he now receives a bargaining equilibrium payo of zero. In the example at hand, player 3
appears to be a \weak" player in the sense that he can never become a proposer except
in the very rst round. One would expect that if  is large enough, player 3's bargaining
power vanishes. However, irrespective of the value of , in equilibrium player 3 obtains his
utopia payo when he is selected as the initial proposer.
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8 Conclusion
We have considered multilateral bargaining games with endogenous protocols. The iden-
tity of the player who rejects the current proposal determines the probability distribution
from which the next proposer is drawn. Surprisingly, the probability with which a player
proposes after another player's rejection turns out to be irrelevant for the prediction of
equilibrium proposals and payos. The probability with which a player proposes after his
own rejection is crucial for the bargaining equilibrium prediction. Our main results high-
light a discrepancy between the case where, conditional on his rejection, the probability
to make a counter-oer is zero for every player, and the case where for some player this
probability is positive.
If the probability to make a counter-oer is zero for all players, then the equilibrium
payos are determined by the utopia payos and the recognition probabilities in the initial
round. Although immediate agreement is reached, the resulting equilibrium utilities are
inecient. Indeed, they do not converge to an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. If one
views the recognition probabilities merely as parameters of the model, one may think of
the ineciency and non-convergence of equilibrium utilities as results which hold true only
in one degenerate case. However, the case where the probability to make a counter-oer is
zero for all players appears more signicant when one takes the perspective of a planner
who designs a bargaining protocol. Such a designer might nd it reasonable to assign to
any rejector a zero recognition probability in order to discourage rejections. The result
shows that the protocol designed in such a way does not ensure eciency, quite to the
contrary, the resulting bargaining equilibrium utilities are Pareto-inecient.
In the case where at least one player does have a strictly positive probability to make
a counter-oer, we obtain the convergence to an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution,
where the weights are assigned to the players in proportion to their probabilities to make
a counter-oer. In particular, if all players have the same strictly positive probability to
make a counter-oer, then the bargaining equilibrium utilities converge to the symmetric
Nash bargaining solution, irrespective of how large that probability actually is.
One rather surprising outcome of our analysis is that the probability to become proposer
conditional on the rejection of another player does not aect bargaining equilibrium payos
at all. This also sheds new light on the ndings in Miyakawa (2008) and Laruelle and
Valenciano (2008) concerning the protocol with time-invariant recognition probabilities,
which is a special case of our model. Under the time-invariant recognition probabilities,
it is impossible to discern the eect of the probability to become proposer after one's own
rejection as opposed to the probability to propose after another player's rejection. Our
more general setup makes the importance of this distinction apparent.
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APPENDIX. Flexible Response Orders
Throughout the paper, we have assumed that players respond to a proposal in the xed order
1; : : : ; n. The purpose of the appendix is to explain that this assumption is without loss of
generality. That is, the results remain true if one allows for the order of responses to be exible.
We make the following modications to the model described in the main text. Let  be the set of
permutations on N . Suppose that 0; 1; : : : ; n are probability distributions on the set N  .
Assume that the proposer and the order of responses in round t = 0 is drawn from 0, and that
the proposer and the order of responses in round t > 0 is drawn from i whenever player i has
rejected the proposal in round t   1. In this game, a stationary strategy for player i consists of
a proposal i; for every  2 , and of an acceptance set Aj;;i for every (j; ) 2 N  . We
refer to the intersection \i2NAj;;i as the social acceptance set Aj;. Each prole of stationary
strategies (;A) induces continuation payos that are independent of the identity of the current
proposer and of the current order of responses. Let Q denote the (n n)-matrix of continuation
payos and r the n-vector of reservation payos, which corresponds to the diagonal of Q. We
denote the kth element of the permutation  by k; and we write S(; k) = fk; k+1; : : : ; ng.
The intersection \j2S(;k)Ai;;j is denoted by Ai;;S(;k):
Lemma A.1 Let (;A) be an SSPE inducing reservation payos r: For all (i; ) 2 N  , the
following hold:
1. If v is such that vn > rn, then v 2 Ai;;n.
2. For every k = 1; : : : ; n  1; if v 2 Ai;;S(;k+1) and vk > rk ; then v 2 Ai;;k :
3. For every k = 1; : : : ; n; if v 2 Ai;;S(;k); then vj  rj for all j 2 S(; k):
The proof of the statements in the lemma above is analogous to the proofs of Lemmas 3.1 and
3.3. The above implies that any payo allocation which is strictly preferred by all players to r
will be socially accepted irrespective of the choice of (i; ). Moreover, any payo allocation which
is strictly worse than the reservation payo for at least one player will be rejected irrespective of
the choice of (i; ).
Lemma A.2 Let (;A) be an SSPE inducing reservation payos r: Then it holds that r 2 V+
and there is v 2 V such that v  r:
Proof: The proof that r 2 V+ is analogous to the proof of Lemma 3.5. We show next
that there is v 2 V such that v  r: Suppose by way of contradiction that r 2 P+. Then, it
follows from Lemma A.1 that [(i;)2NAi;  frg. For every i 2 N , the expected payo of
rejecting a proposal is ri. But if only r can ever be socially acceptable, then ri must be a convex
combination of 0 and ri, where the former has a weight of at least 1  . Hence, it holds for every
i that (1  )0+ ri  ri. Since  < 1, we have ri = 0 for every i 2 N . But r = 0 does not belong
to P+, the desired contradiction. 
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Lemma A.3 Let (;A) be an SSPE. For all (i; ) 2 N  , it holds that i; 2 Ai;.
Proof: Suppose that for some (i0; 0) 2 N  , we have i0;0 62 Ai0;0 . Let j be the rst
player in the response order 0 to reject i0;0 . Consider player i0's continuation payo qji0 after
j's rejection of i0's proposal. We argue rst that qji0 > 0. Every player can guarantee a zero
payo by rejecting all proposals. Thus, it holds that qji0  0. By Lemma A.2 it holds that there
is v 2 V+ such that v  r. By Lemma A.1 it holds that v 2 Ai; for every (i; ) 2 N  ;
so player i0 can guarantee himself a strictly positive payo by proposing such a v. Making the
unacceptable proposal i
0;0 must at least yield such a payo, so qji0 > 0. This implies that for
some (i; ) 2 N  , it must hold that i; 2 Ai;. We can write i0's expected payo after j's
rejection of i
0;0 as qji0 = ^^i0 ; where ^   and ^ is a convex combination of proposals i; for
which it holds that i; 2 Ai;. Given that ^   < 1, there must be some (i00; 00) 2 N   such
that i
00;00 2 Ai00;00 and i00;00i0 > qji0 . But the fact that i
00;00 is accepted implies i
00;00  r. So
there is v 2 V+ such that vi0 > qji0 and vj > rj for all j 2 N n fi0g: By Lemma A.1 it holds that
v 2 Ai0;0;j for all j 2 N n fi0g. But then, player i0 has a protable deviation by proposing v
instead of i
0;0 ; a contradiction since (;A) is an SSPE. 
Lemma A.4 Let (;A) be an SSPE inducing reservation payos r: For every (i; ) 2 N  it
holds that i; 2 P+ and i;j = rj for all j 2 N n fig:
The proof of this statement is analogous to the proof of Lemma 3.7 in the main text.
Since the sets of weakly and strongly Pareto-ecient points in V+ coincide, Lemma A.4 implies
that the proposal i; is independent of the response order  2  and we denote the proposal by
player i by i: Acceptance sets, on the other hand, can depend on the responder order :
Now consider the reservation payo ri. We have shown the immediate agreement property in
Lemma A.3. Thus, we can write
ri = 
X
(j;)2N
ij;
j
i :
We dene ij =
P
2 
i
j;; and obtain that
ri = 
X
j2N
ij
j
i = 
i
i
i
i + (1  ii)ri:
Rearranging this equality yields that ri = i
i
i: Together with Lemma A.3 and A.4, we have
obtained Conditions (3.4){(3.6) of Theorem 3.9 for the more general protocol in the Appendix.
Now it is straightforward to extend all the results in Sections 4, 5, and 6 to this more general
protocol.
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